For nearly three years, Sudan has been ravaged by a brutal war pitting the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces (largely accepted as the forerunner to the notorious janjaweed) against the military government of General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. The toll is staggering: some 150,000 dead and over 11 million displaced.

Meanwhile, the world has stood by in silence. As ordinary Sudanese cry out for help, the global public has met their anguish with a chilling indifference. We have watched, listened and failed them.

But now, something feels different. The horror unfolding in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has jolted even the most indifferent observers. After a year-long siege, the RSF stormed the city on October 26, reportedly following the Army’s withdrawal from its defensive positions. What came next was carnage: an ongoing massacre of men, women, and children, filmed, flaunted, and uploaded by the RSF’s own executioners.

Suddenly, the world seems to be paying attention. Questions once whispered in policy circles are now being asked out loud: How did it come to this? Who is to blame? No amount of Emirati spin can scrub clean the bloodied image of the RSF, no matter how many times they dress it up as a “secular, democratic” force fighting against “evil Muslim Brotherhood islamists”. The footage from El Fasher will haunt our collective memory forever.

But are there really any “good guys” in this war? Is the UAE’s interest in Sudan driven purely by gold and greed? What, if anything, does Burhan’s army really stand for? These are the questions I’ve been wrestling with over the past week.

In my search for clarity, I stumbled upon the X profile of a Sudanese soldier. His feed was a chronicle of the front lines: photos with heavy artillery, victory signs, and battle cries invoking God. Among them, one video seized my attention. He is seen reciting a line of poetry by the famous Egyptian poet Ahmed Shawqi, recently revived by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in exclusive footage aired by Al Jazeera. It goes like this:

(Video posted by Mozaffar on social media quoting the famous poem.)

I decided to follow him, and within hours, he followed back. I reached out to ask if he’d be open to an interview, and soon we were exchanging numbers. His responses came quickly, rich with detail and sincerity, far beyond what I expected.

What follows is the full, unabridged, and unedited interview with Mozaffar Al-Daqil, a volunteer in the Sudanese Army.

Q: First, tell me a little about yourself and your background.

A: I am Mozaffar Al-Daqil. I studied at the University of Khartoum, Faculty of Arts, majoring in Media and Philosophy. I am a political activist, president of “Sudanese Against Normalization”, and a volunteer in the Sudanese Army.

Q: tell me a little about your personal memories regarding the start of the war in Sudan, or as you would call it, the Emirati Aggression. The war began on April 15, 2023. Where were you at that time, and how did you react? Did you expect it to happen? More specifically, was a war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces anticipated for a long time? And what went through your mind as the events started to unfold?

A: The war began while I was near the University of Khartoum, close to the Sudanese army’s General Command. I was trapped at the university for five days because of the fighting, witnessing the first days of the aggression up close. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked the army’s General Command on April 15, but the aggression had started two days earlier when the militia moved forces to Merowe Airport without coordinating with the army. Even the army’s official spokesman announced that the militia had 48 hours to withdraw, showing that the situation had already escalated and could erupt at any moment. This war was not a surprise. It was the continuation of a long-standing project to dominate Sudan politically and constitutionally, following the so-called “color revolution” in 2019. Sudan was then ruled by political parties aligned with foreign powers, which took dangerous steps: bringing in a UN mission, handing political decisions to foreign ambassadors, and normalizing relations with Israel. When the Sudanese people rejected these directions, the military option to impose the project of dismantling Sudan became the only path left for this non-national agenda. To me, it was clear: Sudan has always faced a project of dismantling, division, and subjugation—a project linked to Israel and its expansionist ambitions, supported by its regional allies and local collaborators.

Q: From what I understand from your answer, both the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces are involved in supporting this foreign conspiracy, correct? Now, public opinion worldwide, especially in the West, sees that although the RSF is more brutal and bloodthirsty, the Sudanese army under Burhan is also responsible for crimes and for bringing Sudan to this dangerous stage in its history. You previously told me, and also mentioned on social media, that you decided to volunteer in the army out of a sense of responsibility after realizing that political efforts to end the war and aggression had become futile. Could you tell me a little about your decision to volunteer? What drove you to make that choice? And how did you reconcile it with the negative image the world also holds of the army?

A: First, to be precise: we are talking about a comprehensive project to subordinate Sudan, not merely a conspiracy. Sudan is a post‑colonial state that gained independence from British colonialism in 1956. Since then, the project to subjugate Sudan has continued. The first military uprising in Sudan occurred in 1955, before national independence, and throughout Sudanese history every insurgency has been backed by the United States, the Zionist entity, and their regional proxies. That project has used different instruments, military, political, and social, and the current war is part of these ongoing attempts to bring Sudan under control.

In a 2008 lecture at Israel’s National Security Institute, former Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter described the Zionist strategy in the region and spoke about Sudan, saying: “With its resources and vast territory, Sudan could become a strong regional state competing with countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; it constitutes strategic depth for Egypt, as seen after the 1967 war when it became a base for training and sheltering the Egyptian air force and Libyan forces. Sudan also sent supporting troops to Egypt in the War of Attrition in 1968. Therefore, this country must not be allowed to become an additional power for the Arabs; efforts must be made to weaken it and seize the initiative to prevent the emergence of a strong, unified state. A weak, partitioned, and fragile Sudan is preferable to a strong, unified, and effective one.”

Second, one cannot equate the national Sudanese army with a militia backed from abroad. Despite some mistaken judgments by its commanders at times, the Sudanese army is a national force that enjoys popular support. Claims of crimes attributed to it must be seen in the context of propaganda aimed at dismantling it, because it is one of the last cohesive national institutions that escaped the systematic dismantling during the period of [foreign] political domination in Sudan from 2019 to 2021. Even with external pressure on the military leadership, it must accept responsibility for negligence in allowing this militia to expand.

As for allegations of crimes and abuses by the army, they are propaganda whose falsehood is exposed by the flight of civilians from RSF‑held areas to army‑held areas where they find safety, and by the return of displaced people to their lands after those areas were liberated by the army.

I volunteered for the army because I felt a responsibility toward my country, which I saw being robbed: crimes committed against its people; massacres, forced displacement of neighborhoods, settlement by cross‑border settlers, looting of property, rape of girls, and killing of children, all in the shameful silence of a deceitful world that claims to defend humanity. The war became an existential battle imposed by the aggression on the Sudanese people: either the people defend themselves and their survival, or they are annihilated and occupied. I chose to resist that project and defend my country.

Although I disagree with the army leadership on some issues, it is necessary to distinguish between strategic and tactical matters. Strategically, preserving the state and its existence is paramount; I align with the army leadership on that. Once the state is preserved, Sudanese can pursue their political disagreements by peaceful means, including demanding democracy and peaceful transfer of power, which will not be possible if the Abu Dhabi‑backed militia controls Sudan.

Q: From your description, the period between the Sudanese revolution in 2019 and the start of the war closely resembles the events that preceded the Yemeni revolution in 2014, which is a topic I also discuss at length. Your observation about delegating political and administrative control to foreign ambassadors is exactly what happened in Yemen before the revolution. Could you describe this project in more detail for readers who may not be familiar with what happened in Sudan at that time? Please clarify the conspiratorial Israeli role (if any) in inflaming the current situation in Sudan, and finally, what is the Emirati role in the current war? Why are they so intent on supporting a militia like the Rapid Support Forces? Many commentators and analysts say the UAE is interested in exploiting Sudan’s natural resources, but are there deeper political and strategic considerations that explain this malicious role of the UAE?

A: There were genuine internal conditions related to people’s livelihoods, the economy, political freedoms, and corruption, that called for an uprising against the regime ruling Sudan. Yet much of these conditions were engineered externally through sanctions, economic sabotage, security infiltration of the state and its institutions, and efforts to shift Sudan’s alliances and undermine its strategic projects. When the uprising began in 2018, foreign powers had already prepared certain political groups that exploited the movement, rose to its leadership, and took control of the state after the regime’s fall in April 2019. These groups were known as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which later split into “Sumud” and “Ta’sis,” both backed by the UAE, adopting its narrative and cooperating with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Their experience in power began in August 2019 during the transitional period, one they assumed without election, and ended with their removal by the army in October 2021. That period witnessed the greatest violations of national sovereignty: foreign intervention deepened to the point that external powers controlled Sudan’s political decision-making; national identity and interests were threatened; and the transitional phase was excessively prolonged.

During the period when the externally backed FFC government led by Abdalla Hamdok was in power, it fully complied with foreign demands. Laws that had protected Sudanese social identity and values were amended, such as the penal code and personal status laws, in an effort to replace Sudan’s cultural and moral framework with one aligned to the neoliberal project implemented by that government. These changes opened the door to the disintegration of family and social structures, the normalization of homosexuality, and the spread of neoliberal culture.

There was also a deliberate and systematic assault on state institutions: targeting the public sector under the pretext of reform, forming joint committees with foreign parties, and undermining the army under slogans of “civilian rule” and “democracy” without regard for national security principles. Sudan’s economy was further crippled by opening its markets to transnational corporations. The period also saw the introduction of a UN mission that disrupted political life, and the normalization of relations with Israel.

During this time, the RSF militia expanded dramatically. When the former regime fell, its numbers did not exceed 25,000 and it was under the army’s command. After the new authorities took power, they granted it political roles: its leader became deputy chairman of the Sovereign Council and head of the Economic Committee. The RSF was separated from the army, grew to over 150,000 fighters, acquired advanced weaponry, and was promoted as the nucleus of a “new army” meant to serve foreign interests under the guise of reform.

The UAE’s targeting of Sudan indeed has economic dimensions such as looting Sudan’s natural resources, but also deeper strategic aims tied to the Zionist project of regional expansion, control over maritime routes and the Red Sea (where Sudan has the longest coastline), and the weakening of states that could support resistance or liberation movements. The UAE is waging this war on behalf of Israel, which itself participates by supplying the RSF alongside the Emiratis. According to Sudan’s report submitted to the United Nations, those managing the militia’s supply network are Israelis, Nachman Shai, Ma’in Chein, and Ilan Lotan, all senior figures in the Israeli army and Shin Bet.

Q: In your view, do you think Burhan was forced to announce the normalization plan with Israel? In other words, was he pressured by foreign powers aligned with this external project to make it public? I also have some additional questions: Do you see Sudan’s struggle against this foreign project as linked to Palestine’s struggle, given the involvement of both the UAE and Israel and the imposition of normalization on the post-2019 government? Finally, considering the connection between Sudan and Yemen via the Red Sea and Israel’s controversial access there, how do you personally view Sudan’s participation in the Saudi-led coalition? Was it solely a legacy of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, or how would you define it? It is known that Sudanese regular forces and the Rapid Support Forces were sent to Yemen, and that the RSF still maintains forces there, but I am not certain whether the Sudanese army still has a presence.

A: Normalization in Sudan took place on three levels.

The first level involved al-Burhan, who initiated normalization by secretly meeting Netanyahu in Entebbe, a meeting that was later leaked by the Israelis. According to sources close to him, he acted after learning that the UAE was attempting to establish ties between Israel and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). His move was preemptive, aimed at blocking the RSF, but even if we accept this explanation, it is still a flawed assessment. Normalization is a breach, and a breach cannot be addressed by another breach. For this reason, we continue to call on the state to reverse this process.

The second level involved normalization with the RSF through the UAE. The RSF has benefited from this relationship in military, intelligence, communications, and other areas, with ties continuing to the present day.

The third and most dangerous level involved normalization with the country’s political leadership, the “Forces of Freedom and Change.” These forces repealed the “Israel Boycott Law,” which had been passed by an elected parliament, and signed the Abraham Accords, represented by Justice Minister Nasr al-Din Abdelbari, who is now part of a coalition allied with the RSF militia. They also removed the Palestinian cause from school curricula and erased content related to defending the homeland, promoting cultural and educational normalization instead.

At all levels, this normalization remained isolated from the people, who rejected it and actively opposed it. Nevertheless, it posed a serious threat to the country’s security and sovereignty and laid the groundwork for the aggression we see today. The main beneficiary has been the RSF militia.

Sudan’s participation in the aggression against Yemen was a political decision made by a state infiltrated by foreign intelligence. It came after executive and security circles persuaded President Bashir that Sudan needed to join Operation Decisive Storm. These circles gained influence after South Sudan’s secession, which left Sudan with a gap in oil resources. The state made the mistaken decision to rely on Gulf countries to fill this gap, which increased their influence in Sudan and allowed them to interfere in political decisions. Even Omar Bashir’s chief of staff, Taha al-Hussein, was an Emirati agent who escaped without punishment. Gulf influence continued until Bashir’s fall and beyond, with the UAE remaining dominant. Sudan has still not announced its withdrawal from Operation Decisive Storm, likely because of its regional alliances, while Saudi Arabia, amid its quiet rivalry with the UAE, supports the Sudanese army.

Overall, Sudan’s participation in the aggression against Yemen was a strategic mistake, resulting in the needless bloodshed of innocent citizens who should have been engaged in dialogue rather than fighting each other.

(Video posted by Mozaffar on social media documenting heavy clashes against the RSF on the frontline.)

Q: My final question: Do you have a personal message you would like to share with the world, which has now become aware of the brutality of the Rapid Support Forces militia and the criminal Emirati aggression? What would your message be to those active in support of the Palestinian cause? And what stance should the world, and the free people of the world, take regarding Sudan?

A: My message is that what is happening in Sudan must be correctly understood: it is part of the Zionist project to expand in the region and establish the so-called state from the Nile to the Euphrates; the Nile that begins in Sudan and then flows into Egypt. This war is not an internal power struggle, as it is often portrayed; it is a genuine struggle by a people resisting Emirati subjugation of Sudan in favor of the Zionists. The struggle of the Sudanese people is the same as the struggle of the Palestinian people, a struggle for dignity, freedom, and independence, and the enemy is the same one that threatens everyone with liquidation and displacement.

The free people of the world must approach Sudan as a matter of a people’s survival and liberation from colonialism and murderous militias operating within a broader regional project that serves a criminal colonial center. They must act to confront and expose this enemy, starting with media pressure and raising awareness about these crimes and those behind them, and extending to political and legal measures that pursue the perpetrators, corner them in their embassies, uncover their supply chains and arms companies, and trace the corrupt funds financing these massacres.

News from Yemen rarely reaches the headlines these days. For the past two years, global attention has been consumed by Israel’s horrific and psychopathic bloodletting in Gaza, with the world equally surprised by Yemen offering its unconditional and stubborn military support for the oppressed Palestinian people.

Before October 2023, however, the crisis in Yemen was widely labeled the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Millions were living on the knife’s edge of starvation, trapped by a suffocating blockade so brutal and fundamentally illegal that it seemed almost impossible to fathom.

Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a regional coalition, with backing from the United States and Britain, in a campaign to undo Yemen’s September 21st Revolution of 2014. Ten years on, their efforts have yielded nothing but abject and embarrassing failure.

The 2022 UN-sponsored ceasefire froze open hostilities, allowing warring parties to entrench themselves. The Sana’a-based government and the endless array of proxy forces it has long battled now govern their territories with uneasy permanence.

It should surprise no one familiar with the conflict that foreign powers have long funded, armed, and trained local proxies to advance their political and economic agendas. Saudi Arabia has served as the chief patron of the so-called “Internationally Recognized Government”—a body that holds little real authority on the ground—while the UAE has nurtured what can best be described as a smorgasbord of often competing militias, most notably the separatist Southern Transitional Council and, since 2018, the “National Resistance” led by former dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew Tariq Saleh, along Yemen’s embattled West Coast.

In recent weeks, a series of leaked Emirati documents from 2021, first reported by veteran Yemeni journalist Anis Mansour, have surfaced online. Although their authenticity has yet to be independently verified, I find them credible enough to warrant public attention. They shed light on the machinery driving the occupation of South Yemen and expose the UAE’s deliberations with its proxies as they carve up the country for ends that serve not Yemenis, but the geostrategic ambitions of neo-mercantile powers determined to keep the Peninsula’s only republic fractured, divided, and perpetually unstable.

(Note: Each covered document will contain a download link. While all the pages are included in each PDF file, I cannot guarantee correct page sequence.)

Bargaining for a Tribal Head

Among the leaked files is a document titled “Minutes of the Military Operations Area Meeting – Marib, Al-Bayda, Ibb, Taiz,” stamped with the official letterhead of the UAE Ministry of Defense. Its opening page contains a letter signed by Saeed Ali Khamis Al-Kaabi, publicly known as the Director of Humanitarian Operations for the Emirates Red Crescent in Yemen, yet identified here as a Brigadier General and commander of the “West Coast Forces.” A designation, it seems, that was never intended for public eyes.

Minutes Of The Military Operations Area Meeting Marib, Al Bayda, Ibb, Taiz

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The letter is addressed to Major General Saleh bin Muhammad Al-Amiri, officially serving as Commander of Joint Operations in the UAE Armed Forces. Al-Amiri is a central military figure within the Saudi-led Coalition and has played a key role in directing both Emirati troops and allied proxy forces across southern Yemen.

The accompanying letter to Maj. Gen. Al-Amiri indicates that the meeting minutes were prepared for his personal review. It quickly becomes clear that the following pages outline plans for a potential military campaign aimed at dislodging Yemen’s Shabwa province from its surroundings, presumably in order to cement direct Emirati control over the territory.

The document then provides a concise summary of the meeting’s agreed points, detailing the allocation of resources for what are described as “polarization operations” in Marib, Al-Bayda, and Taiz. In this context, “polarization” refers to efforts to recruit or sway influential tribal and political figures through bribery and other inducements.

The document then lists the date of the meeting, May 8th, 2021, and senior attendees, primarily three figures linked to the “National Resistance.” Present were Tariq Saleh—the nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and current commander of the “National Resistance”—his brother Ammar Saleh, and the aforementioned Brigadier General Saeed Al-Kaabi.

What follows is a stark transcript of the meeting, laying bare the unvarnished strategy for Yemen’s future. Brigadier General Al-Kaabi begins not with battlefield tactics, but with a plan to systematically buy the loyalty of an entire region. He instructs his Yemeni allies to “polarize every important and influential person in Marib and Al-Bayda.” Ammar Saleh confirms the scale of the operation, presenting a preliminary list of 35 key personalities in Marib alone. When Al-Kaabi asks about the price, Ammar’s response is chillingly direct: “Every head can be bent for a million dirhams.”

Tariq Saleh elaborates on this transactional approach to alliance-building, offering a grim proverb that seems to define their strategy: “You cannot buy the loyalty of a tribe, but you can rent this loyalty for a specific amount and for a known period of time.” The plan, as detailed, is warfare by checkbook, aiming to fracture northern Yemeni society from within by turning its leaders into paid assets.

The minutes reveal that the ultimate target of this operation is not solely the Ansar Allah movement. In one of the most explosive revelations, Brigadier General Al-Kaabi tasks his allies with preparing a plan for “specific operations to completely eliminate the Legitimacy”—a direct reference to Yemen’s so-called “internationally recognized government”, the very entity the Saudi-led Coalition was officially there to prop up. This objective is coupled with a secondary plan to “deal with Al-Qaeda in Al-Bayda,” but the priority is unmistakable.

The geopolitical maneuvering behind this strategy is laid bare when the Saleh brothers are instructed to remove Saudi-aligned figures from their lists of polarization targets. When questioned, Al-Kaabi explains that the Emirati and Saudi leadership have reached a deal: “Saudi Arabia will concede all southern governorates in exchange for us putting our full military weight into the war.” This admission points to a backroom agreement to partition Yemen into spheres of influence, with the UAE securing control over the strategic south. To enforce this, Tariq Saleh is ordered to conduct a 100km withdrawal of his forces, a command he calls “very embarrassing” but is nonetheless expected to obey.

The tactics discussed extend beyond bribery into overt economic warfare. Tariq Saleh proposes a plan for Ibb governorate that includes “an exceptional bombing that destroys the economic environment,” which he suggests should be “accompanied by the withdrawal of currency.” This strategy aims to induce chaos and cripple the region’s economy, deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure to achieve military goals.

The meeting also highlights the deeply cynical nature of the conflict’s alliances. When the challenge of confronting Al-Qaeda in Al-Bayda is raised, Ammar Saleh offers a startlingly pragmatic solution: “The areas… where Al-Qaeda is concentrated, we leave them to the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group. They are capable of dealing with them.” The admission that the coalition would outsource its counter-terrorism fight to its primary enemy reveals the fluid and self-serving priorities governing the war.

Throughout the transcript, a palpable tension over money and corruption lingers. Al-Kaabi openly accuses his Yemeni partners of graft, questioning where the funds from past operations have gone: “The results on the ground are less than 10% of what is expected... where does the other 90% go, ya Ammar?” Yet, in the same breath, he cynically institutionalizes it, instructing them to factor in their own cut. “Don’t forget to put in Ammar’s share,” he says, adding, “there is no harm if he buys a few villas and a palace in Germany. We consider it a reward for you.”

A Secret Alliance Revealed

A second, more explosive document from the leaked cache provides an unprecedented look into the covert architecture of the UAE’s war in Yemen, revealing a deep and fraught alliance with Israel and their key Yemeni proxy, Tariq Saleh. Titled “Report on the Resistance’s Relationship with Israel,” the 25-page file is an internal Emirati investigation into Saleh’s unsanctioned dealings with Israeli intelligence. It paints a vivid picture of a partnership built on strategic necessity but plagued by profound mistrust, culminating in a dramatic confrontation where the Emiratis move to bring their unruly ally to heel.

Results Of The Meeting With The Command Of The National Resistance On The Western Coast Of Yemen (report On The Resistance’s Relationship With Israel)

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Notably, the entire document is presented on official Emirates Red Crescent stationery. This peculiar detail strongly suggests a deliberate blurring of lines between humanitarian aid and covert operations, indicating that Saeed Ali Khamis Al-Kaabi leverages his humanitarian position to mask his parallel role in military and intelligence activities.

Before detailing Saleh’s transgressions, the report first establishes the official, extensive military cooperation between the UAE and Israel on Yemen’s Western Coast, which is hardly a distant, arms-length relationship. The document meticulously tables joint operations throughout 2018 and 2020, including:

• The deployment of five Israeli frigates and two submarines near the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait.

• The integration of 42 Israeli pilots for “permanent participation” in bombing campaigns.

• The establishment of a joint operations room with Emirati, Israeli, and Yemeni participation.

• Joint naval maneuvers in the Red Sea following the Abraham Accords, which included “joint naval landing tactical exercises” for Tariq Saleh’s National Resistance forces.

This foundation of sanctioned cooperation makes the subsequent accusations of clandestine side-dealings all the more significant.

The heart of the document is the transcript of a tense meeting on October 10, 2021, at the command headquarters in Mokha. Emirati commanders, led by Brigadier General Saeed Al Mazrouei and Brigadier General Saeed Al Kaabi, effectively put Tariq Saleh on trial for his perceived betrayals.

The Emiratis open with a clear accusation of disloyalty. “Let’s be clear, we operate based on what we know about you,” Al Mazrouei began, adding with a thinly veiled threat, “and we are confident that you have been communicating with the Americans and Israelis outside of our approved channels. It seems you are looking for alternative patrons in case we decide to leave you.”

Saleh’s denials are repeatedly brushed aside as the commanders present a list of specific infractions:

1. Mishandling Israeli Weapons: Al Mazrouei accused Saleh of secretly transferring a shipment of Israeli-supplied arms. “Those were just light arms, and many were defective—nothing more than scrap,” Saleh explained defensively. He insisted the weapons had to be moved because “they were dangerous and could have exploded at any moment, causing a disaster.”

2. The Sale of an Ancient Torah: In a bizarre and telling exchange, Al Kaabi confronted Saleh about the fate of an ancient Torah manuscript gifted to him by an Israeli expert. After Saleh admitted to having passed it on, Al Mazrouei delivered the damning charge: “That Torah was sold by an Israeli dealer named Sami Awfi for $700,000,” he stated flatly. “Why didn’t you tell us? Your own brother, Ammar, was the one who informed us about it.”

3. Unauthorized Labor at an Israeli Base: The Emiratis revealed they knew Saleh’s forces had been working at a secret Israeli-built airbase in Dahlak, Eritrea. “My men take official vacations,” Saleh argued. “If they choose to work elsewhere during that time, that is their right. They always return to their duties.”

Having laid out their case, the Emirati commanders deliver their verdict. Saleh’s autonomy is to be severely curtailed. “The operations room will be restructured, and from now on, you will be nothing more than an external observer,” Al Mazrouei commanded. “We will establish a new, official channel for your communications with the Israelis, one that will be completely transparent to us.”

The meeting takes a historic turn when the Emiratis reveal the deep roots of this relationship. Al Kaabi informed Saleh that his uncle, the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, was the original architect of the alliance. “The relationship between your uncle, the martyr, and Israel was more than excellent,” Al Kaabi revealed. “His cooperation with them began back in 2007,” he continued, adding the stunning detail that “your uncle even visited Tel Aviv for a secret two-day meeting with Netanyahu.”

Rather than being chastened, Tariq Saleh embraced this history. “I was simply a soldier following orders then,” he responded. “It was my uncle, the martyr, who began this relationship, and I intend to continue on the path he started.”

The Emirati commander’s stunning revelation that Ali Abdullah Saleh maintained a “more than excellent” relationship with Israel, culminating in a secret visit to Tel Aviv to meet with Netanyahu, might seem incredible. Yet, this claim is not without precedent and appears to confirm long-standing allegations about the former dictator’s covert dealings. In October 2020, the Yemeni Armed Forces of the Sana’a-based government published a highly detailed report documenting the increasingly tight relationship between Saleh’s regime and Israel. Yemeni military officials listed several incidents proving this relationship, such as:

1. A visit by an Israeli Knesset delegation to Sana’a in March 1996.

2. Saleh’s 1997 admission to an Arab official of ongoing visits by Israeli officials, and his decision that same year to partially lift the boycott on Israeli goods—a move rewarded by the US with spare parts for Yemen’s F-5 aircraft.

3. A direct meeting between Saleh and then-Israeli President Ezer Weizman in March 2000, a fact that Brigadier General Yahya Saree, the spokesman of the Yemeni Armed Forces, noted was leaked by Israeli radio just ten minutes after it concluded, causing Saleh “great embarrassment.”

4. A plan since 2004 to grant approximately 60,000 Israelis with Yemeni citizenship, including jews of Yemenite origin, with a quarter of them being Israelis with dual American citizenship.

The leaked minutes, therefore, do more than expose the actions of Tariq Saleh; they lend significant weight to the charge that his family’s political survival had long been tied to a hidden, pragmatic, and deeply cynical back-channel relationship with Tel Aviv.

The meeting concludes with a discussion of future plans. The UAE pressures Saleh to publicly announce his support for normalization with Israel, a move he resists, citing the “inherently hostile” political climate in northern Yemen.

A solution is then proposed for encouraging Israeli investment on the Western Coast without provoking a public backlash. The commanders agree that Israeli investors should use foreign passports to hide their origins. Saleh proposed an open invitation for them to come with “European, Ukrainian, or similar passports and invest,” calling it “an invitation for them to launder their identities.”

Gold Rush in the East

The third and final leaked document covered in this article, titled “Special Document: Results of Mineral Exploration Activities in Al-Mahra Governorate, Yemen,” reveals a detailed and audacious plan by the United Arab Emirates to secure and exploit vast mineral resources, particularly gold, in eastern Yemen. The 18-page report, prepared by the UAE’s Special Unit (T) in Yemen and addressed to the Joint Operations Command, functions as a confidential geological survey, a political risk assessment, and a strategic blueprint for overcoming local resistance to seize control of what it estimates to be a very lucrative, unexplored gold deposit.

Special Document Results Of Mineral Exploration Activities In Al Mahra Governorate, Yemen

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The report frames its mission under a political guise. It begins by citing an agreement with its key Yemeni ally, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which allegedly tasks the UAE with helping the STC achieve southern “independence” by extracting the region’s mineral wealth.

To provide a legal basis for the operation, the report invokes a 2005 license granted by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Thani Dubai National Mining for gold prospecting in Hadhramaut. The document argues that a clause in this old license allows for its expansion into the adjacent Al-Mahra governorate, a legal justification it has bolstered with a new deal concluded with the “head of the legitimate government.”

To execute the plan, the report details the creation of a new company operating under the cover of “Thani Dubai.” This firm secured an agreement, ostensibly to prospect for emeralds, but the report makes clear the real targets are far more valuable. In exchange for granting a 50-year concession for prospecting and exportation rights, the Yemeni Prime Minister and the STC’s Minister of Transport were to be “rewarded with millions of dollars.”

The core of the document is the stunning results of the exploration survey, conducted by a handpicked international team of experts from Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Brazil, Ukraine, and the UAE. After conducting geological mapping, rock sampling, and analysis, the team presented its staggering conclusions. The report confidently asserts that Al-Mahra holds (kilograms per cubic meter (kg/m³):

• Estimated Gold Reserves: 124.1

• Estimated Zinc Reserves: 147.29

• Estimated Iron Reserves: 33.33

(Note: A previous rendition of this article concluded the preliminary results to be in the millions, which is geologically impossible. This came from a misreading of the table in the document, and has since been corrected)

The document also notes significant deposits of nickel, lead, copper, and silver, concluding that Al-Mahra “holds a great deal of this wealth,” making Yemen potentially one of the richest mineral zones in the world.

Despite the immense potential wealth, the report dedicates significant space to detailing the formidable obstacles standing in the way of extraction. It outlines six primary challenges:

1. Sheikh Ali Salem Al-Harizi: The report identifies the influential local sheikh as the leader of the popular resistance, noting that he has successfully funded and organized opposition to the UAE’s presence for years.

2. The Islah Party: The document expresses concern over the “expected mobilization of armed elements” from the Islah Party (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen), who are embedded within the internationally recognized government.

3. Conflicting Foreign Interests: The report notes friction with “British and Israeli military commanders participating in the coalition’s operations at Al-Ghaydah airport.”

4. Saudi Arabia: The document cryptically refers to the “negative role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Al-Mahra.”

5. Oman: The report accuses the neighboring Sultanate of Oman of supporting “opposing institutions, fronts, and personalities.”

6. Popular Rejection: Finally, the document concedes that there is a “popular rejection of any presence, which is a general mood” hostile to the UAE.

The final section of the report lays out a detailed and ruthless strategy to overcome this widespread resistance. The proposals amount to a comprehensive plan to militarize the region and co-opt local leaders:

• Create a Local Proxy Force: The top recommendation is to “recruit 5,000 soldiers from the sons of Al-Mahra” to serve as a loyal local force.

• Establish Military Bases: The plan calls for establishing military camps and training centers strategically located “near the areas with mineral wealth.”

• Control Borders and Demographics: The report advises using STC forces to “close the Nishtun port and the Sarfit and Shahan crossings,” specifically to “expel the displaced people from the northern governorates.”

• Renew “Polarization” Efforts: The document calls for a renewed campaign of bribery to “polarize the influential personalities who have not responded to previous attempts,” specifically naming key leaders of the local councils and sit-in committees.

• Neutralize Sheikh Al-Harizi: After admitting that relying on the Saudis to control Sheikh Al-Harizi has failed, the report implies a more direct approach is needed.

• Launch a Propaganda Campaign: The final proposal is to “employ all media capabilities to change the popular mood in Al-Mahra that is hostile to the Emirates.”

A Colonial Blueprint

What emerges from these scattered pages—a meeting about bribes, a tense confrontation over Israel, a corporate-style plan for a gold rush—is not a series of isolated events, but a single, chillingly coherent blueprint for the subjugation of a nation. As I sifted through the minutes, the mechanics of the UAE’s agenda came into sharp focus, revealing a strategy that is as cynical as it is meticulous.

The first document shows us the ‘how’: a war fought with checkbooks, where a commander casually discusses the price of loyalty “per head” and plans are laid to “completely eliminate the Legitimacy”—the very government the coalition claimed to be saving. This is a world where corruption isn’t just tolerated but encouraged, with proxies offered “villas in Germany” as a reward for their compliance.

The second document reveals the ‘who’ and ‘why’: a deep-seated, covert military alliance with Israel, designed to project power across the Red Sea region. This partnership is so vital that even their own proxy, Tariq Saleh, must be brutally disciplined for stepping out of line, his secret dealings exposed and his autonomy curtailed. The minutes confirm a long history of these back-channel arrangements, tracing them back to a secret meeting between Tariq’s uncle and Benjamin Netanyahu, framing the current conflict as merely the latest chapter in a decades-long game. Crucial to mention, however, is that Israel’s attempt at regional power projection in the Red Sea region has the past two years been proven entirely futile, and have not been able to stop the Ansar Allah from conducting its operations in support of & solidarity with the Palestinian people - among other things.

Finally, the third document lays bare the ultimate prize: the cold, hard calculus of economic extraction. Here, we see the blueprint for a neo-colonial venture, with detailed plans to seize Al-Mahra’s allegedly rich gold deposit. The local population, with their legitimate resistance to foreign occupation, are not seen as people to be won over, but as obstacles to be managed through a combination of a new, 5,000-man proxy militia, targeted bribes, and a full-spectrum propaganda campaign. The solution to dealing with Israeli investors in a hostile environment? A cynical directive to have them “launder their identities” with foreign passports.

This blueprint for resource extraction is not unique to Yemen. It finds an uncanny parallel in Sudan, where the UAE has been a key foreign backer of the brutal Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in their devastating war against the Sudanese army. For years, reports have detailed how Emirati support—in the form of weapons, financing, and diplomatic cover—has fueled the RSF’s campaign. The motive, as it has become increasingly clear, mirrors the agenda laid out in the Al-Mahra report: to secure privileged access to Sudan’s vast gold deposits. By propping up a powerful militia with a history of controlling the country’s mines, the UAE is once again using a proxy force to advance an extractive agenda, ensuring that the immense wealth beneath the soil flows not to the Sudanese people, but into the vaults of Abu Dhabi. The tactics may be adapted, but the goal remains the same: leveraging conflict to secure a permanent stake in another nation’s natural resources.

The authenticity of these documents can and will undoubtedly be debated, but the pattern they reveal is too consistent to ignore. This is the machinery of an oft-forgotten occupation, one that seeks to control a nation not by winning hearts and minds, but by purchasing loyalties, managing assets, and carving up resources. They reveal a vision for Yemen not as a sovereign state to be rebuilt, but as a fractured dominion to be managed, its people a problem to be solved, and its wealth a prize to be claimed.